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Summary. Trusted Computing is a seurity base tehnology that will
perhaps be ubiquitous in a few years in personal omputers and mobile
devies alike. Despite its neutrality with respet to appliations, it has
raised some privay onerns. We show that trusted omputing an be
applied for servie aess ontrol in a manner proteting users' privay.
We onstrut a tiket system  a onept whih is at the heart of
Identity Management  relying solely on the apabilities of the trusted
platform module and the standards speied by the Trusted Computing
Group. Two examples show how it an be used for pseudonymous and
proteted servie aess.
1 Introdution
In a tiket based authentiation and authorisation protools like Kerberos [1℄
software tokens are used to prove the identity of a single entity. Based on this
tokens aess to ertain systems is restrited to entities produing appropriate
tokens. Additionally data embodied in the token an be used to implement also
an authorisation ontrol enabling a token based aess ontrol sheme beside the
mere authentiation. These tokens are an eletroni analog to physial tikets.
They an have a limited validity period ore be used a speied number of times.
For the adept, some base onepts of Trusted Computing (TC) look very
similar to Identity Management (IDM). We exploit the analogy between TC
and IDM and onstrut a tiket system using TC funtionality, thus obtaining
a ornerstone of IDM systems. The appliability of suh a trusted tiket system
is shown in the ontext of a reputation system and a push servie.
Setion 2 provides neessary bakground on TC. Setion 3, developing the
trusted tiket system proper is subdivided in 3.1, explaining how to use Attes-
tation Identity Keys (AIKs) for the realisation of tikets, and 3.2 detailing the
proeedings for the aquisition and redemption of the latter. Setion 3.3 outlines
a general servie aess arhiteture utilising trusted tikets, with a high degree
of separation of duties, providing for pseudonymity, aountability, and harg-
ing funtionality. Setion 4 embeds trusted tiket systems in the two mentioned
appliation ontexts and disusses resulting benets. Conlusions are drawn in
Setion 5.
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2 Trusted Computing Essentials
Trusted omputing uses a hardware anhor as a root of trust and is now entering
the mobile domain with the aim to provide a standardised seurity infrastru-
ture. Trust in the ontext of TC means (as dened by the Trusted Computing
Group, TCG) that an entity always behaves in the expeted manner for the
intended purpose. The trust anhor, alled Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
oers various funtions related to seurity.
Eah TPM is bound to a ertain environment and together they form a
trusted platform (TP) from whih the TPM annot be removed. Through the
TPM the TP gains a ryptographi engine and a proteted storage. Eah phys-
ial instantiation of a TPM has a unique identity by an Endorsement Key (EK)
whih is reated at manufature time. This key is used as a base for seure
transations as the Endorsement Key Credential (EKC) asserts that the holder
of the private portion of the EK is a TPM onforming to the TCG speiation.
The EKC is issued as well at prodution time and the private part of the key
pair does not leave the TPM. There are other redentials speied by the TCG
whih are stating the onformane of the TPM and the platform for instane
the so alled platform redential. Before a TPM an be used a take ownership
proedure must be performed in whih the usage of the TPM is bound to a
ertain user. The following tehnial details are taken from [2℄.
The TPM is equipped with a physial random number generator, and a
key generation omponent whih reates RSA key pairs. The key generator is
designed as a proteted apability and the reated private keys are kept in a
shielded apability (a proteted storage spae inside the TPM).
The TPM possesses so-alled shielded apabilities proteting internal data
strutures by ontrolling their use. Three of them are essential for appliations.
First, key reation and management, seond the ability to reate a trust mea-
surement whih an be used to assert a ertain state toward a, remote party,
and nally methods, whih we all sealing, to protet arbitrary data by binding
it (in TCG nomenlature) to TP states and TPM keys.
For the TPM to issue an assertion about the system state, a proess alled
attestation, two protools are available. As the uniqueness of every TPM leads
to privay onerns, they provide pseudonymity, respetively, anonymity. Both
existing attestation protools rest on Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) whih
are plaeholders for the EK. An AIK is a 1024 bit RSA key the private portion of
whih is also sealed inside the TPM. The simpler protool of Remote Attestation
(RA) oers pseudonymity by introduing a trusted third party, the privay
CA (PCA, see [3℄), whih issues a redential stating that the respetive AIK
is generated by a sound TPM within a valid platform. The system state is
measured by a reporting proess with the TPM as its entral reporting authority
reeiving the measurement values and alulating a unique representation of the
state using hash values. For this the TPM has several Platform Conguration
registers (PCR). Beginning with the system boot eah omponent reports a
measurement value, e.g., a hash value over the BIOS, to the TPM and stores it in
Trusted Tiket Systems and Appliations 3
Signed
PCR
AIK
credential
PCA Priv PCA Pub
AIK credential
ID Label AIK Pub
Platform
type
Platform
mfg
TPM
type
TPM mfg
Conformance
reference
Ref to 
signer
Signature by PCA
Fig. 1. Remote Attestation proess.
a log le. During RA the ommuniation partner whih ats as verier reeives
this log le and the orresponding PCR value. The verier an then deide if
the devie is in a onguration whih is trustworthy from his perspetive. Apart
from RA, the TCG has dened Diret Anonymous Attestation. This involved
protool is based on a zero knowledge proof but due to ertain onstraints of
the hardware it is not implemented in urrent TPMs.
AIKs are ruial for appliations sine they an not only be used, aording
to TCG standards, to attest the origin and authentiity of a trust measure-
ment, but also to authentiate other keys generated by the TPM. Before an
AIK an testify the authentiity of any data, a PCA has to issue a reden-
tial for it. This redential together with the AIK an therefore be used as an
identity for this platform. The protool for issuing this redential onsists in
three basi steps. First, the TPM generates an RSA key pair by performing the
TPM_MakeIdentity ommand. The resulting publi key together with ertain
redentials identifying the platform is then transferred to the PCA. Seond, the
PCA veries the orretness of the produed redentials and the AIK signature.
If they are valid the PCA reates the AIK redential whih ontains an identity
label, the AIK publi key, and information about the TPM and the platform. A
speial struture ontaining the AIK redential is reated whih is used in step
three to ativate the AIK by exeuting the TPM_AtivateIdentity ommand.
So far, the TCG-speied protool is not ompletely seure, sine between steps
two and three, some kind of handshake between PCA and platform is missing.
The existing protool ould sensibly be enhaned by a hallenge/response part
to verify the link between the redentials oered in step one and used in step
two, and the issuing TPM. The remote attestation proess is shown in gure 1.
Beside the attestation methods TC oers a onept to bind blobs of data
to a single instantiation and state of a TPM. The TPM_unbind operation takes
the data blob that is the result of a Tspi_Data_Bind ommand and derypts
it for export to the user. The aller must authorise the use of the key that will
derypt the inoming blob. In onsequene this data blob is only aessible if
the platform is in the namely state whih is assoiated with the respetive PCR
value.
4 Niolai Kuntze and Andreas U. Shmidt
A mobile version of the TPM is urrently being dened by the TCG's Mobile
Phone Working Group [4℄. This so-alled Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) diers
signiantly from the TPM of the PC world and is in fat more powerful in some
respets. In partiular, it ontains a built-in verier for attestation requests,
substituting partly for an external PCA. Both TPM and MTM are a solid basis
for appliation arhitetures and senarios. Trusted Computing not only aets
the world of networked PCs but will also heavily impat the mobile industry.
Aordingly, one of our appliation senarios see setion 4.2 is a mobile one. The
onept for tiket system we present in setion 3 is in fat network agnosti and
an be applied to the Internet as well the mobile world. Further mobile senarios
an be found in [6, 7℄.
3 A TC-based Tiket System
The basi idea is to establish a (pseudonymous) tiket system using the iden-
tities embodied in the PCA-ertied AIKs. Spei about our design is the
tikets are generated loally on the (mobile) devie of the user. Tiket aqui-
sition an redemption rests solely on trusted omputing methods implemented
in the TPM hip embedded in the users platform. We rst desribe how AIKs
an be turned into tikets that an be used in a tiket-based servie aess
or identity management arhiteture, and then develop the proesses for their
aquisition and redemption.
3.1 AIKs as Tikets
For seurity onsiderations the TPM restrits the usage of AIKs. It is not possi-
ble to use AIKs as signing keys for arbitrary data and in partiular to establish
tikets in that way. It is therefore neessary to employ an indiretion using a
TPM generated signing key and ertify this key by signing it with an AIK 
viz ertify it in the parlane of the TCG. Creation of a key is done by exe-
uting the TPM_CMK_CreateKey ommand, whih returns an asymmetri key
pair where the private portion is enrypted by the TPM for use within the
TPM only. The resulting key pair is loaded into the TPM by TPM_LoadKey and
thereafter ertied by TPM_CertifyKey. By ertifying a spei key the TPM
makes the statement that this key is held in a TPM-shielded loation, and
it will never be revealed. For this statement to have veraity, a hallenger or
verier must trust the poliies used by the entity that issued the identity and
the maintenane poliy of the TPM manufaturer.
This indiretion reates to eah AIK a ertied key (by the namely AIK)
that an be used for signing data, in partiular the payload data of a tiket to
be submitted to, and aepted by, a servie. We all this key pair the ertied
signing key (CSK). CSK, AIK, together with a ertiate by the PCA (see
below) attesting the validity of that AIK, are the ingredients that realise a
tiket for a single operation, e.g., a servie aess.
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3.2 Tiket Aquisition and Redemption
Tikets are aquired by a trusted agent (TA), i.e., the user of a tiket system and
assoiated servies operating with his trusted platform, from the PCA. They
are then redeemed at the (tiket) reeiving system (RS). In both proesses, a
harging provider (CP) may our as a third party, depending on appliation
arhitetures. We now desribe how these operations proeed.
Note that we do not distinguish between publi and private key por-
tions of a ertiate establishing a redential. As a notation, the redential
of some ertied entity Cert(entity, ertiate) means the union of the pub-
li key Pub(ertiate) and the entity signed with the ertiate's private key,
entity
Priv(ertiate). Verifying a redential means to hek this digital signature.
An interesting option is that the redentials issued by the PCA for a AIKs
an be designed as group redentials , i.e., they do not identify a single AIK viz
tiket but rather its prie or value group g hosen from a predetermined set in-
dexed by the natural numbers g ∈ {1, . . . , G}. The group replaes an individual
identity of a platform and many TAs will get the same group ertiate. Only
the PCA an potentially resolve the individual identity of a platform. This al-
lows for the ombination of a value proposition with privay protetion, as these
groups are used to implement prie and value disrimination of tikets. Note
that the PCA is free in the hoie of methods to implement group ertiates.
This ould be done by simply using the same key pair for the group or by the
existing, sophistiated group signature shemes [5℄.
If a TA wants to aquire a rating tiket from group g, he rst generates
an AIK using the TPM_MakeIdentity ommand. Next, TA requests from the
PCA a redential for this AIK, belonging to group g, by sending AIK, group
identier and supplementary data as required by TCG protools, to the PCA.
The PCA now knows the identity of the TA. This an be used to perform a
harging for the tiket, either by ontating CP or by the PCA itself (how
harging atually works is not in the sope of this paper). It is important that,
at this stage, an authorisation deision on the tiket generation an be made by
the PCA, for instane to blaklist misbehaving partiipants. If the authorisation
sueeds (and not earlier, to save bandwidth and resoures), the PCA performs
a handshake operation with the TA to ensure that the AIK has atually been
generated by the partiular TPM in question. Upon suess, the PCA generates
the redential Cert(AIK, g) ertifying that the AIK belongs to group g. The
redential is transferred bak to TA, where nally the TPM_AtivateIdentity
ommand is exeuted to enable subsequent usage of this AIK. The proess is
shown on the left hand side of Figure 2.
Redeeming a tiket is now very simple, as shown on the right hand side
of Figure 2. TA has rst to generate a CSK, i.e., a publi/private key pair
and the redential Cert(CSK,AIK) for it aording to the proess desribed
in Setion 3.1. He then signs a ertain payload, P , e.g., desribing a servie
request, with CSK to obtain Cert(P,CSK). The payload and the redential
hain Cert(P,CSK), Cert(CSK,AIK), Cert(AIK, g) is then transferred from
6 Niolai Kuntze and Andreas U. Shmidt
AIK, supplementary cred., identifier g
Cert(AIK,g)
handshake
TA PCA
generate AIK
TPM_MakeIdentity
authorisation
charging
AIK credential
creation
activate AIK
TPM_ActivateIdentity
P, Cert(P,CSK), Cert(CSK,AIK), Cert(AIK,g)
ACK
TA RS
generate CSK,
Cert(CSK,AIK),
Cert(P,CSK)
Verification,
authorisation
charging
via PCA
Fig. 2. Tiket aquisition (left) and redemption (right) proesses.
TA to RS and this set of data embodies the tiket proper (we do not disuss
a partiular data format for the tiket). RS veries this hain and makes an
authorisation deision, for instane to implement a protetion against multiple
spending. Finally, RS aknowledges reeipt of P and optionally initiates another
harging operation (ex post harging) via PCA.
3.3 A Generi Arhiteture for Servie Aess
The embedding of the desribed tiket aquisition and redemption into an appli-
ation system and business ontext oers many variants. A very basi senario
is shown in Figure 3. Here, a trusted agent (user) would like to aess some ser-
vie, and buys a tiket of a ertain value from the PCA. The tiket belongs to
a ertain group whih an represent statements suh as for usage with Servie
n, and a ertain value, monetary or intangible, e.g., in a rebate sheme. The
user then issues a servie request as payload in the tiket redemption toward
RS. The TA pays for the tiket at the CP at the time of redemption of the
tiket and the CP distributes revenue shares between himself, PCA, and RS,
aording to servie level agreements. RS, in turn, remunerates the servie (an
aknowledgement of servie proessing is omitted for simpliity).
This realises an aess ontrol sheme to multiple servies mediated by PCA
and RS, yielding three essential benets: 1. non-repudiation by the hain of
redentials, 2. aountability by resolution of the TA's identity through PCA,
and 3. pseudonymity by separation of duties. The PCA/RS ombination plays
a very entral role for the ontrol of identities embodied in the pseudonymous
tikets that PCA issues. It is in fat an embodiment of the role of an identity
provider in a tiket-based identity management (IDM) system. That TC an
be used to model IDM was outlined in [6, 7℄, and is presented here for the rst
time in detail.
Though the separation of duties between PCA and CP allows in priniple
even for anonymity of the person using a TA, sine only upon harging this
person must be identied by redit ard aount or other means, this may
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Fig. 3. A generi arhiteture using TC-based tikets.
not be the best option. In fat this would loose some aountability of the TA
users. While RS may be able to obtain personal identities from PCA if pertinent
ontratual relationships are in plae, e.g., if fraud by a TA user is suspeted,
data protetion regulations may prevent a CP from unveiling personal identities.
A seond role played by the PCA is the initiation of harging. With respet to
the revenues from tiket sales, a natural approah is a sharing between RS and
PCA (and CP for its servie). RS and PCA negotiate and implement poliies
for authorisation within the tiket aquisition and redemption proesses, e.g.,
to prevent double spending or to blaklist misbehaving users. In ollaboration
between PCA and RS, pratially any prie shedule an be realised.
This arhiteture naturally extends to an arbitrary number of reeiving sys-
tems to whih PCA oers tiket management, and in partiular priing, as
servies. A further extension would be to let TA express values of tikets by
using dierent (groups of) CSKs. In this way tikets an be assoiated with
additional ertied attributes, e.g., priorities.
3.4 Seurity and Privay
The presented method for the management of tikets provides for perfet
pseudonymity of the partiipants toward the system. In fat, only PCA is able
to de-anonymise users.
Note that for the namely reason only PCA an initiate a harging, sine
only he knows (or is able to know) the identity of a TA and an link it to the
identity of the orresponding partiipant. To keep this pseudonymity strength,
it is essential that our onept relies only on genuine TPM funtionality, and in
partiular avoids the usage of trusted software. If there was a trusted software
managing tikets in some way at the side of TA, then this software, and the
state of the platform would have to be attested both in tiket aquisition and
redemption. To this end the TC protools for remote attestation transfers trust
measurements and measurement logs to the orresponding verier (PCA or
RS in our ase). These data an however  and this is a prinipal problem
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with remote attestation  be used to individualise the trusted platform, if,
as in the PC domain, the number of system states and dierent measurement
logs reated at boot time, is very large in relation to the number of users of
a TC-based servie. Besides, avoiding remote attestation saves bandwidth and
resoures onsumption. Sine in this ase no trust an be laid in the TA for
tiket management, some kind of double, or multiple, spending protetion or
usage authorisation is needed at RS upon tiket redemption.
On the other hand seurity neessitates additional means of protetion of
ontent in transit. In many appliations, for instane if ondentiality of trans-
ported payload is a protetion target, trusted software usage annot be avoided
We show in Setion 4.2 how TC an be used to establish end-to-end protetion
for P , but this denitely requires trusted software lients at both ends.
4 Two Appliations
4.1 Prie Sheduling in Pseudonymous Rating Systems
This appliation has been outlined in [8℄. Eletroni market plaes for physial
and information goods are inreasingly oupied by self-organising ommuni-
ties. These market plaes exhibit the harateristis of the so-alled long tail
eonomy [9℄. That is, the lassial asymmetry between suppliers and onsumers
is lifted. Buyers and sellers are often even in numbers and may hange their
roles dynamially. Virtual, or physial, goods are oered in large numbers and
diversity and with potentially small demand for eah single one. Mathmaking
and orientation of buyers is diult in a long tail eonomy, long term relation-
ships are hard to build, and trust between trade partners must be established
somehow [10℄.
A ommon approah is to let market players themselves provide the nees-
sary guidane. This is mostly embodied in reputation systems by whih buyers
and sellers rate eah other and the goods sold, or reommendation systems,
i.e., programs whih attempt to predit items that a user may be interested in,
given some information about the user's prole. Reputation systems, aord-
ing to Paul Resnik et al. [11℄ seek to establish the shadow of the future [the
expetation of reiproity or retaliation in future interations, f. [12℄℄ to eah
transation by reating an expetation that other people will look bak on it.
The goal is to establish a homogeneous market for honest partiipants. That
ommunity ratings (of goods) do in fat strongly inuene buyer behaviour is
shown empirially in [13℄.
Existing reputation systems are fragile, in that they an easily be distorted
or abused even within the frame of laws governing them. `Attaks' of this kind,
though not proper attaks in the sense of information seurity, threaten the in-
tegrity  with respet to its purpose  of the informational ontent stored in
the system. Dellaroas [14℄ lassies unfair behaviour into the ategories 1. Bal-
lot stung : A seller olludes with a group of buyers in order to be given unfairly
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high ratings. 2. Bad-mouthing : Sellers and buyers ollude to rate other sellers
unfairly low to drive them out of the market. 3. Negative disrimination: Sell-
ers provide good servies only to a small, restrited group of buyers. 4. Positive
disrimination: Sellers provide exeptionally good servie to some buyers to
improve their ratings. A situation of ontrolled anonymity in whih the market
plae knows the identity of partiipants and keeps trak of all transations and
ratings, but oneals the identity of buyers and sellers, is identied as essential
to avoid unfair behaviour. For instane, anonymity is an eetive protetion
against bad-mouthing, but annot work for ballot stung as sellers an give
hidden indiations of their identities to olluders.
On the other hand, the best known individual attak on reputation sys-
tems uses Sybils to obtain a disproportionately large inuene [15℄. Friedman
and Resnik [16℄ point to the general problem of `heapness' of pseudonyms in
marketplaes and reputation systems, sine with name hanges dishonest play-
ers easily shed negative reputation, as orroborated theoretially in [17℄. The
paper [18℄ gives an expliit threshold for the transation osts for reputations
needed to avoid ballot stung. However, an indisriminate priing of identities
for the submission of ratings poses an undesired entry deterrent. It seems there-
fore plausible that reputation systems should be based on pseudonyms whih
allow for a exible forward priing.
While related work addresses partiular vulnerabilities [19℄, or proposes gen-
eral frameworks to ensure aountability in reputation systems while maintain-
ing anonymity [20, 21℄, we here propose a simple mehanism to introdue arbi-
trary osts for pseudonyms. The separation of duties between PCA and RS in
our tiket system implements here preisely the ontrolled anonymity desired
for reputation systems through the properties 1.3. mentioned in Setion 3.3.
Again, the generi tiket system an be embedded in various ways into a
(ommerial) reputation system. If a TA user wants to express a rating about
another user (for example, a buyer about a seller, a seller about a buyer), he
buys a rating tiket from the PCA. The group attribute of the tiket in this
speial ontext expresses a value proposition for the rating, e.g., an impat fa-
tor used by the rating system to alulate weighted overall ratings, as well as an
attribution to a partiular rating system. The user then formulates the rating
and sends it to RS as tiket payload, and harging is exeuted. The result would
be a rating statement about another partiipant of the rating system whih is
trustworthy, aountable, but proteted as a pseudonym. This enables the res-
olution of one important problem in reputation systems, namely aountability
of users, i.e., the possibility to trae bak maliious ones and threaten them
with onsequenes. Based on the trusted tiket system, prie shedules an be
adapted to the requirements of rating systems as laid out above. On the extreme
ends of the spetrum are ost-free registration of ratings by PCA, ensuring only
aountability, and inreasing harges with the number of ratings (or, e.g., their
frequeny). Even reverse harging, i.e., paying inentives for ratings, e.g., suh
of good quality, is possible.
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4.2 Content Protetion for Push Servies
Workers oupied with `nomadi' tasks depend on infrastrutures for easy and
swift aess to required data. E-Mail push servies like RIM's Blakberry on-
quer this market with huge suess, and aim at high availability and ease of use.
Push servies are haraterised by the ability to notify end users of new ontent.
For an e-mail servie the end user devie is ativated by the mail server, gets
new mail, and noties the user. The basi method for this has been formulated
for instane in the standards of the Open Mobile Alliane (OMA, see [23℄). Some
providers have extended their range to enable aess to ompany databases and
implement loosely oupled work-ows inorporating nomadi workers.
Due to the high value of the exhanged data these systems are threatened
by, even professional, attakers, raising the requirement to protet the distri-
bution of pushed data. Seurity onerns an be grouped in two main areas.
First, data has to be proteted in transit to the devie, and ondentiality is
to be maintained. Seond, after the data is delivered it has to be proteted
against unauthorised aess. The latter problem is of pratial importane in
use ases like the mentioned e-mail push, but also for SMS delivery, and other
data synhronisation proesses between a entral data base and a mobile devie.
Current approahes to this hallenge are predominantly using software tokens,
e.g., PKCS#7, to seure message transport and storage. Suh solutions however
suer from the drawbak that an attaker an extrat keys from memory dur-
ing enryption or deryption of a data blok. Smart ards are a more evolved
approah, but in the mobile domain no standard has beome prevalent.
Mail-Server
Database Server
Content Server
Internet
Corporate
Firewall
Push-Server
Network Operation Center 
(NOC)
Network Operator
Fig. 4. A entralised arhiteture
Figure 4 illustrates the widely used, entralised push arhiteture. In its
entre a Network Operation Center (NOC) performs all tasks regarding the
ommuniation to the mobile devies. The data destined for the mobile devies
are stored in soures like mail servers. These soures exite the push server and
deliver the data. Due to this ativation the push server either requests a om-
muniation line to the mobile devie managed by the NOC or delivers the data
to the NOC whih in turn stores the data until they are handed to the mobile
devie. From a ompany's view the management osts are low as there is no
additional eort needed to maintain, e.g., a speial rewall onguration. The
deentralised ounterpart inludes diret ommuniation between push server
and mobile devie, requiring aess over, e.g., the Internet to servers behind a
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ompany rewall, in turn neessitating speial protetion of the internal infras-
truture. Taking a maliious servie provider into onsideration privay on-
erns are added to the general ones regarding transport seurity. Potentially
the NOC an aess every message whih is sent to a mobile devie, allowing
for information leakage. First and foremost the message ontent ould be ex-
trated and dislosed. Moreover, analysis of the ollaboration between ative
users beomes possible. Both attaks have to be treated in the protool design
to enable end-to-end seurity and to oneal all sensitive information.
Data Source
Synchronisation
Server
5) data source transmits
new data to
synchronisation server
2) online attestation of
the mobile device
Mobile devicePCA
1) creation of binding
key & transfer to PCA
3) issue certificate
Creation of
binding key
Registration
Usage of
binding key
7) Acknowledge sucessful data transmission
6) transmission of the encrypted data blobs
4) registration of binding key
Data source
Synchronisation
server
1) data source transmits new 
data to synchronisation server
3) online attestation of the 
mobile device
6) Acknowledgement of 
sucessful data transmission
Mobile device
2) establishment of a 
secure channel
4) key exchange for data
protection
5) transmission of 
encrypted data blobs
Fig. 5. Senarios based on blob sealing (left) resp. key sealing (right)
Protetion of ontent is a major use ase for trusted omputing [22℄. We rst
present basi options to protet push ontent, and then desribe the integration
with th trusted tiket system of Setion 3. Based on blob binding (see Setion 2)
the simplest senario see the left diagram in Figure 5. First, the data soure
signals the synhronisation server (SynS) whih then loates the target devie,
establishes ommuniation, and ontrols the synhronisation relying on, e.g.,
OMA data synhronisation. Channel seurity an be realised using Transport
Layer Seurity. Remote attestation of the devie and key exhange for payload
enryption are performed. The data is transferred to the devie and stored in
sealed blobs, see [2, Chapter 12℄, only aessible in the determined state of this
unique devie. This approah suers from lateny produed by the Steps 2-4,
in partiular attestation reates omputational load and produes some tra.
An approah to meet this hallenge is shown on the right hand side of
Figure 5. SynS enrypts the data with a publi part of a key pair. The use of
the orresponding private part is restrited by a PCR value. To grant trust in
this publi key the SynS requires a ertiate issued by a PCA, and a ertied
PCR value, signifying, e.g., the presene of an e-mail appliation in a ertain
onguration and a well dened environment. The PCA whih erties the
platform keys an atually be used here to issue ertiates augmented by the
information of the PCR value. This variant of an AIK is further alled a binding
key. Step 1 transmits the publi portion of a key pair to the designated PCA
for ontent enryption keys. Remote attestation is performed and a ertiate
is reated stating that the key originates from a TP and is usable if and only if
the platform is in a ertain state. This ertiate is transmitted to the mobile
devie, and then, together with the binding key, to SynS. Steps 1 to 4 only have
to be performed one during roll out of the devie or take ownership by its user.
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In Step 5 the data is transmitted to SynS, whih an now enrypt the data
with the binding key or with a hybrid sheme. Data transmission is exeuted in
Steps 57. Note that the rst presented method is muh more exible than the
seond one, sine in the former the server an deide eah time if the partiular
devie an be onsidered as trustworthy.
The ombination of the tiket system with the ontent protetion system
proeeds as follows. After it has been ativated, the mobile devie uses a tiket
obtained from the PCA as a token to aess SynS whih an either be the
RS itself or an assoiated servie. The tiket AIK annot be used for data en-
ryption, but the tiket payload an arry the mentioned publi key for ontent
enryption, and its ertiate. The tiket PCA an at onurrently as the CA
ertifying the binding key or in separation from it. Tiket grouping or priori-
tising an be used advantageously in suh a sheme, e.g., for attribution of
bandwidth to a request and load balaning.
5 Conlusions
We have shown how to generate and use tikets based on TC, and have provided
theoretial proof-of-onept in two independent appliation senarios employing
trusted tikets. What we have onstruted is essentially a payment system with
a trusted third party guaranteeing pseudonymity. It is therefore worthwhile to
ompare our method with the use ase senario Mobile payment of TCG's
Mobile Phone Working Group Use Case Senarios [22, Setion 8℄. There, the
fous lies on devie-side support of payment operations on a mobile phone whih
is turned into a trusted platform. This always involves a trusted software on
the devie whih is not required in our approah. On the other hand this is only
possible through the introdution of a trusted third party, the PCA with its
extended duties. Thus we lak the universality of lient-side solutions. Yet we
have shown that a very simple tiket system with strong pseudonymity an be
established resting solely on the most basi TPM funtions.
It should be noted that our appliations use TC in a way very dierent from
Digital Rights Management (DRM), whih is often onsidered as the sole use
for TC. Both appliations bind the eonomi value to a partiular instantiation
of the TPM. If this trust anhor breaks, only a limited damage an our as the
damage is restrited in spae and time, e.g., to a single data synhronisation in
a push servie or submission of a single reputation. In ontrast, if a single TPM
in a DRM system breaks, the proteted digital good an be onverted into an
unproteted version whih an be freely distributed on a large sale, ausing
heavy monetary losses to its owner.
It is interesting to note that introduing TC yields a seondary user bound
identiation token. Due to the take ownership proedure of the TPM it is
bound to a ertain user. Therefore it is in its funtion very similar to a SIM
as it is also possible to migrate the relevant parts from one TPM to the next.
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One may ask whether two dierent identiation tokens will survive in future
TC-enabled mobile devies.
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